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ABSTRACT
CCTV (Closed-Circuit Television) and sensor based intelligent surveillance systems have attracted
considerable attentions in the field of public security affairs. To provide real time reaction in the case
of a huge volume of the surveillance data, researchers have proposed event reasoning frameworks for
modelling and inferring events of interest. However, they do not support decision making, which is very
important for surveillance operators. To this end, this paper incorporate a function of decision making
in an event reasoning framework, so that our model not only can perform event reasoning but also
can predict, rank, and alarm threats according to uncertain information from multiple heterogeneous
sources. In particular, we propose a multi-attribute decision making model, in which an object being
watched is modelled as a multi-attribute event, where each attribute corresponds to a specific source,
and the information from each source can be used to elicit a local threat degree of different malicious
situations with respect to the corresponding attribute. Moreover, to assess an overall threat degree
of an object being observed we also propose a method to fuse the conflict threat degrees regarding
all the relevant attributes. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework by an airport
security surveillance scenario.
Keywords: multi-attribute decision making, uninorm, decision making under uncertainty,
event modelling and reasoning, D-S theory of evidence, ambiguity, surveillance systems.
1. INTRODUCTION
Due to the increasing threats of terroristic and criminal behaviours in the present
world, researchers have developed lots of intelligent surveillance systems, such as suspect
object tracking14,19,34,46, intrusion detection4,54, indoor security systems52,65, traffic safety
analysis51,61,70, anti-social behaviour analysis3,7,48, and so on. The primary aim of these
studies is to develop security system that can detect and predict the potential threats of
objects being watched according to a large collection of meaningful events that are derived
from sensory data of dispersed sources. To proactively utilise the large amount of basic events
in surveillance applications, obviously these events should be analysed in real-time, so a built-in
event reasoning system is in need. Thus, researchers developed plenty of event modelling and
reasoning systems1,26,56, which can predict well threats or actions that may lead to devastating
consequences. However, to date few of them have studied event modelling and reasoning
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together with the decision making problem: how to rank the potential threats of multiple
objects being watched, and select some of them to carry out further appropriate actions (e.g.,
preventing the action of a suspect immediately, stop monitoring to some suspects, and so on)
according to uncertain and conflicting information from different sources?
This decision making problem is extremely important because in reality the security
operator often has to make decisions in the case that the security resources are limited11 but
plenty of malicious behaviours happen simultaneously. For example, several event concerning
security could happen simultaneously during 21:00 to 21:15 in an airport:
• In the shopping area, a person (ID: 13) loiters near a foreign currency exchange shop
from 21:03 to 21:15. Also, camera 42 captures the person’s back image at the entrance
of the shopping area at 21:01 and camera 45 captures the person’s side face image at the
foreign currency exchange shop from 21:03 to 21:15.
• In the control centre, at 21:03, the face of a person (ID: 19) appears in camera 29 in the
middle of the corridor to the control centre at 21:03. Unfortunately, the person’s face is
not recorded by camera 23 (which is monitoring the entrance to the corridor). In other
words, it means the person may be illegally infiltrating the control centre.
Support that a system can recognise age, gender, and behaviour, and then re-acquire objects
being watched when necessary, and at that time period there is only one security team available.
Then, the system needs to distinguish the potential threat degree of each object being watched
and selects the one with the higher potential threat to deal with. In other words, the system
needs to rank the potential threats according to the following two factors:
(i) Belief (i.e., what the system believes). For example, if a person enters a security zone in
an airport with its back facing the camera, the person may be classified as a male with a
certainty of 65% by a gender classification algorithm. This is the uncertain belief of the
system on the person’s gender.
(ii) Utility (i.e., what the system assesses). That is, the preference degree of the states of
interest according to the mission of the system. In a surveillance system, since it is
designed to identify and prevent threats, such a state can be about a person’s gender,
emotion, intention, and so on. In the example that a person enters a security zone in
the airport, regarding the person’s gender, the state of male should be more aggressive
than that of female. Accordingly, the threat degree of a male object should be higher
than that of a female (statistics have been consistent in reporting that men commit more
criminal acts than women12,62).
Moreover, in reality an event can be detected at the same time by different sensor
technologies, including audio, video, and other types of sensors (even including humans).
Hence, important is how to fuse the information from multiple sensors regarding the same
object to obtain an overall assessment of its potential threat. A typical scenario is that a camera
in a security zone detects an unknown male (thus relatively higher potential threat); while the
personnel authentication identification system strongly indicates the person just is a new staff
(thus relatively low potential threat). In this case, should the system assign the object with
a high threat degree or a low threat degree? A reasonable method for handling this problem
is to consider a number of independent attributes (e.g., gender, age, ID, and behaviour) to
individually rate the potential threat of an object from the system’s local perspective (what
it believes and what it assesses), and then aggregate these local assessments to an overall
one. Thus, since these local assessments are not completely consistent and the priorities of
attributes concerned are different, an adequate weighted aggregation operator is required in
order to obtain the overall assessment.of potential threat for each watched object and resolve
the inconsistent or conflicting threat assessments of the watched objects in surveillance.
Therefore, in this paper we propose an integrated framework for event reasoning and
decision making for distributed intelligent surveillance systems. More specifically, based on
Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory of evidence55, we first propose a model of the multi-attribute
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event under uncertainty. Then we use a normalised version of the Hurwicz’s attribute20 to
obtain the degree of potential threat of each watched object with respect to each attribute.
Finally, according to some intuitions in surveillance, we use a specific weighted uninorm
aggregation operation63,36,35 to obtain the overall degree of potential threat for each suspect
after considering all relevant attributes, from which the priority for monitoring each object
can be derived.
This paper advances the state of the art in the area of intelligent surveillance systems in
the following aspects. (i) We identify two factors that influence the potential threats of objects
being watched in a surveillance system: belief and utility. (ii) We propose an event model
to estimate the potential threats of suspects based on multiple sources with heterogeneous,
uncertain information. (iii) We develop a decision support model to reduce the burden of
exhaustive event-rule structures, which is inefficient for large scale threat prevention problems.
(iv) We integrate the event reasoning with a decision support model for distributed intelligent
surveillance systems, using a multi-attribute fusion architecture.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 recaps D-S theory and the event
modelling framework. Section 3 discusses the basic requirements for an appropriate multi-
attribute event reasoning framework with decision support. Section 4 presents our multi-
attribute event model. Section 5 develops a decision support model with an aggregation
operator to handle the problem of judging the levels of potential threats for multiple suspects.
Section 6 illustrates the effectiveness of our model. Section 7 discusses related work. Finally,
Section 8 concludes this paper with future work.
2. PRELIMINARIES
This section recaps some basic concepts in D-S theory of evidence.
Dempster and Shafer18,55 extend the concept of probability to the following one:
Definition 1. Let Θ be a set of exhaustive and mutually exclusive elements, called a frame of
discernment (or simple a frame). Mapping m : 2Θ → [0, 1] is a mass function if m(∅) = 0 and∑
A⊆Θm(A) = 1.
Since the sources where relevant evidence comes from may not be completely reliable in
reality, Lowrance, Garvey, and Strat33 introduce the concept of Discount rate, by which a
mass function can be discounted to reflect the reliability of evidence:
Definition 2. Let m be a mass function over a frame of discernment Θ and τ (0 ≤ τ ≤ 1) be
a discount rate to reflect the reliability of the source, where the evidence that the mass function
reflects is from. In particular, when τ = 0, the source is absolutely reliable; and when τ = 1,
the source is totally unreliable. Then the discounted mass function, denoted as mτ , is given by:
mτ (A) =
{
(1− τ)m(A) if A ⊂ Θ,
τ + (1− τ)m(Θ) if A = Θ. (1)
Once a mass function has been discounted, it is then treated as fully reliable.
D-S theory of evidence also provides a rule to combine several mass functions that reflect
multiple pieces of evidence from different kinds of independent sources as follows:
Definition 3. Let m1 and m2 be two mass functions from independent and fully reliable
sources over a frame of discernment Θ. Then the combined mass function of m1 and m2 by
Dempster’s combination rule, denoted as m1,2, is defined as:
m1,2(x) =
{





1−k if x 6= ∅,
(2)








is a measure of the conflict between the pieces of evidence in the combination.
Finally, in order to transmit the belief distributions from preconditions to the conclusion in
an inference rule, Liu, Hughes, and McTear32 propose a modelling and propagation approach
based on the notion of evidential mapping as follows:
Definition 4. Γ∗ : 2ΘE → 22ΘH×[0,1] is an evidential mapping, which establishes the
relationship between two frames of discernment ΘE and ΘH , if Γ
∗ assigns a subset Ei ⊆ ΘE
to a set of subset-mass pairs in the following way:
Γ∗(Ei) = {(Hi1, f(Ei → Hi1)), . . . , (Hit, f(Ei → Hit))}, (4)
where Hij ⊆ ΘH (i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ {1, . . . , t}) and f : 2ΘE × 22
ΘH → [0, 1] satisfy:
(i) Hij 6= ∅;




f(Ei → Hij) = 1;
(iv) Γ∗(ΘE) = {(ΘH , 1)}.





mΘE (Ei)f(Ei → Hij). (5)
3. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyse some basic requirements that an appropriate multi-attribute
event reasoning framework with decision support should meet.
(i) The uncertainty of event recognition. The reason why video sensors cannot provide
complete, accurate information for a scenario evolving over time is that an event recognised
by a video analysis algorithm may be uncertainty. For instance, it could be very difficult
for a system to judge a person is a male or female when the camera just captures the back
of the person. Therefore, an intelligent multi-attribute surveillance system should be able to
represent and infer useful information with uncertainty. Moreover, in this case, the person
may be classified as a male with the certainty of 65% by a gender classification algorithm.
Nevertheless, it does not mean that the remaining 35% should simply be classified as female.
Perhaps it is unknown how to distribute the certainty of 35% on male or female. In order
to handle the ambiguous information, we employ D-S theory of evidence. Along with this
challenge comes the issue of reliability of sources. That is, when a classification algorithm is
used to detect an event that is not 100% accurate itself, how to intergrade the reliability of
the algorithm with the detected events (which are uncertain)?
(ii) The discrimination between threat degree and belief of threat. The main goal of the
intelligent surveillance system is to detect and prevent the potential threat of suspects based on
a sensor network. However, due to the uncertainty of recognised events, to achieve the goal the
system needs to consider the threat degree of an abnormal behaviour as well as the belief that
such a potential threat happens. For instance, in an airport scenario, a surveillance system
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detects, with a very high belief degree, that two young people are fighting in the shopping
area, and at the same time, with a medium belief degree, that a person has left a bomb in
airport terminal 1. In this case, an appropriate multi-attribute event reasoning framework with
decision support should be able to determine the priorities of these two cases when only one
security team is available at that moment.
(iii) The independence of the threat assessments regarding multiple classification
algorithms. In the airport surveillance scenario we gave in Section 1, since usually the
classification algorithms of the surveillance system can just provide uncertain information
regarding more than one attribute (i.e., watched object’s age, gender, behaviour, and watched
object re-acquisition), the event model must reflect all of the information for further reasoning
and decision making. Nevertheless, since an output from a sensor-data classification algorithm
focuses on a single attribute and the information provided by each classification algorithm is
concerned with two aspects (i.e., threat degree and belief of threat) as mentioned in Challenge
(ii), it is difficult to give an overall threat assessment of a watched object by an event that
considers the effect of all the relevant attributes without an aggregation method. Therefore, a
definition is required for multi-attribute event modelling.
(iv) The efficiency of decision support. In reality, most of malicious behaviours occur in
a short period of time. As a result, the surveillance system has to be able to make a decision
rapidly to prevent the potential threat.
(v) The criticality of event for threat assessment. A CCTV-based surveillance system may
need to handle events in different places at different time points, so the extent of attention on a
given event should be different after considering the spatial-temporal background information.
For instance, an event that happened in an area with high crime statistics at midnight should
be more critical than an event that happened in an area of low-crime statistics in the morning.
The higher the criticality of the events, the more attention the security team should pay.
Thus, the multi-attribute event modelling and reasoning framework with decision support
should reflect the property in threat assessment.
(vi) The conflict of multiple threat assessments. A CCTV-based surveillance system could
consist of hundreds of cameras and a number of algorithms to classify the characteristics of
interest for a given watched object in, for example, a medium-size airport. Thus, according to
different cameras/sensors or different classification algorithms, the assessment of the potential
threat of the watched object could be conflicting. Typically, from a camera in a security zone a
strange male is detected (higher threat), but the personnel authentication identification system
strongly indicates the person is a new staff (lower threat). As a result, we need a proper method
to resolve this conflict.
(vii) The assessment aggregation of potential threat. A straightforward method to handle
a multi-attribute threat assessment problem in a surveillance system use a number of
independent attributes (e.g., gender, age, ID, and behaviour) to individually assess the
potential threat of a watched object, and then to combine these individual assessments to
gain an overall assessment. Since these individual assessments cannot always be completely
consistent and the priorities of these attributes could be different, we need an adequate
aggregation operator to obtain the overall assessment of the potential threat degree of each
watched object and resolve the inconsistency or conflict between them.
Actually, the above seven challenges reflect the basic requirements for our multi-attribute
event modelling and reasoning framework with multi-attribute decision support. To take
challenge (i), we can associate a mass function to an event to reflect its uncertainty, and
put the influence of the reliability degree of the sensors into account as well. To take challenge
(ii), regarding the independence of multiple classification algorithms, we make it clear that each
atomic event should be related to one classification algorithm only. That is, an atomic event
regards only one of attributes. To take challenge (iii), we need to define a utility function on
the state set of each attribute. For instance, for the attribute gender, possible states male and
female should be mapped to a utility value to reflect their threat degrees. To take challenge
(iv), a decision making model is required. To take challenge (v), we will propose a threat
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assessment method that considers the significance of an event with respect to each attribute.
Finally, to take challenges (vi) and (vii) we will propose an aggregation operator to give an
overall threat assessment based on the threat assessment of each attribute. These are the
content of the following two sections.
4. EVENT REPRESENTATION AND REASONING
In this section, we will define multi-attribute events and their reasoning rule.
First, we discuss the formal definition of an atomic event. Intuitively, a specific event
definition should be determined by a real-world surveillance application for all the attributes
concerned. Moreover, some common attributes should be held in order to construct an atomic
event for detecting the potential threat of objects being watched. Formally, we have:
Definition 5. An atomic event e for detecting the potential threats is a tuple
(Te, te, loc, IDs, c, IDp, dsr(IDs), des(t, loc), wc,mc, uc),
where:
(i) Te is the type of event e;
(ii) te is a time interval during which event e is observed;
(iii) loc is the location of a source from which event e is detected;
(iv) IDs is the identification of a source from which event e is detected;
(v) c is one of the attributes that are used to assess potential threats for a watched object;
(vi) IDp is the identification of a watched object/person from which event e is detected;
(vii) dsr(IDs) is the degree of reliability of source IDs, which is obtained by a reliability function
r : S → [0, 1], where S is the set of sources and IDs ∈ S;
(viii) des(t, loc) is the degree of criticality of event e based on background knowledge defined
by the location and time event e happened at, which is obtained by a criticality function
des : T × L→ [0, 1], where T is the set of time points, and L is the set of the locations
of the sensors with loc ∈ L;∗
(ix) wc is the importance degree of an attribute c in terms of determining a potential threat of
event e, obtained by w : C → [0, 1], where C is the set of attributes that can be detected
by the sensor network and c ∈ C;
(x) mc : 2
Ωc → [0, 1] is a mass function over the set of possible states of a given attribute
c to represent the uncertain results of a classification algorithm of the sensor related to
event e; and
(xi) uc : Ωc → Θ is a utility function over the set of possible states of a given attribute c to
represent the threat degree of a state, where Θ = {hi | hi ∈ R, i = 1, . . . , n}.
The following is an example of atomic events.
∗Here, for a time interval, we will consider the time point t with the highest significance degree.
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Example 1. Suppose we are monitoring some people passing an airport security area. Then
an atomic event could be
eg =(PPSA, 18:03–18:05, ASA1, 43, gender, 12, 0.9, 0.8, 0.3,
(mg({male}) = 0.7,mg({male, female}) = 0.3), ug).
That is, for an event with type PPSA (Person Passing Security Area) at 18:03–18:05, in
Airport Security Area 1 (ASA1) sensor 43 detects the gender of the watched object with ID
12 by the corresponding classification algorithm, the reliability degree of the sensor is 0.9, the
criticality of this event is 0.8, and the weight of attribute gender for detecting a potential threat
is 0.3. Moreover, the watched object is recognised as male with a certainty of 70%, and 30%
that the gender of the watched object is not clearly known. Finally, the level of potential threat
for each state of the gender attribute (i.e., male or female) is given by utility function ug.
There might be a set of events with the same attribute, watched objects’ IDs, and event
type but different source IDs or observed time points or locations. For example, a person
(with watched object ID 12) broads a bus with its back facing camera 1 at 21:15 and then
sits down with its side face detected by camera 2 at 21:20. Suppose the gender classification
algorithm indicates that m1g({male}) = 0.5 and m1g({female, male}) = 0.5 by the data from
camera 1, and m2g({male}) = 0.7 and m2g({female, male}) = 0.3 by the data from camera 2.
Since they refer to the same attribute about the same watched object in the same case from
different sources, we need to combine these two events to figure out the gender of the watched
object. In our model, the combination of events is realised by Dempster’s combination rule
on discounted mass functions. That is, first we use formula (1) to obtain the discounted mass
functions based on the value of dsr(IDs,i) (i.e., the reliability of source with ID i); and then
we use formula (2) to combine the discounted mass functions. Here, since we have defined that
events can have a time duration, events in an event flow with a time duration shares one mass
function.
Now we consider the event reasoning in our framework. Since in our model we only care
about the decision support issue based on the potential threat of the suspects, we just give a
set of inference rules which focus on the meaningful event (i.e., the event relevant to a potential
threat). More specifically, we have:
Definition 6. An inference rule in our framework is defined as a tuple (Te,
Condition,mIET, uIET), where:
(i) Te is the type of event;
(ii) Condition is a conjunction of a set of conditions for selecting related events from the
event flow to infer another event;
(iii) mIET is a mass function for the possible intention of a watched object; and
(iv) uIET is a utility function presenting what the system desires.
†
In the above definition, since mIET is a mass function over a set of exhaustive and mutually
exclusive elements, it can be defined over two different kinds of frames of discernment: (i) a
frame of discernment about the possible intention of a watched object; and (ii) a frame of
discernment about the potential threat: {Has Threat, Has No Threat}. And when analysing
events with multiple attributes, the criticality of an event, the weight of different attributes, the
possible states of each attribute, and so on should all contribute to the assessment of potential
threats. Thus, it is unreasonable to ask experts to directly assign the degree of a potential
threat without any knowledge about the factors that contribute to the threat. In contrast, the
values of possible intentions of a watched object can be easily obtained by some historical data,
†We will discuss more details about utilities in next section.
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some pattern recognition algorithms or the judgments of experts directly. For example, mIET
for the event inference rule about loitering in a ticker counter is over a frame {Rob, Waiting
Friends}. And we divide behaviours into different categories, such as movements, relations
with objects, relations with peoples, hand actions (e.g., to detect a fight), and so on.
Moreover, by the above definition, we can infer watched objects’ intentions just according
to their behaviours because of several reasons. First, many social psychology studies have
revealed that humans can infer the intentions of others through observing their behaviours8,23.
Nonetheless, it lacks strong evidence to support that people’s intentions are directly concerned
with their age, gender, and emotion, especially when we desire to infer the malevolence
intention of the watched objects to assess their potential threat. So, to reduce the complexity
of constructing the inference rules, we do not consider other attributes except the behaviour
of the watched objects in inferring their intentions. Second, in a multi-attribute surveillance
environment, it could be very difficult for a security expert to assess the possibility of various
intentions of a watched object regarding multiple attributes. For example, it is easy for an
expert to assess the intention of a person who loiters at a ticket counter since the expert
just needs to consider the relation between a certain behaviour (e.g., loitering) and different
intentions; but if the expert considers three attributes of age, gender, and behaviour, somehow
it is difficult to figure out who (e.g., an unknown age man or a young unknown gender person,
both loitering at a ticket counter) has a higher chance to rob. Third, by distinguishing the
effect of each attribute for the degree of potential threat separately, our definition considers the
criticality function of an event and the weights of attributes in contributing to the assessment
of potential threats to a given target. We will discuss these issues in details in the next section.
The following is an example for the event inference rule in our model about the intention
of a watched object in the shopping area at an airport:
Example 2. The rule describing that a person loitering in the Foreign Currency Exchange
(FCE) shop at an airport could be suspicious can be defined as (Te, Condition, wIPL, mIPL,
uIPL), where:
• Te is IPL (Intention of Person Loitering) in the foreign currency exchange shop;
• Condition is defined as:
(mmi ({loiter}) > 0.5) ∧ (loc = the foreign currency exchange shop)
∧ (te,n − te,0 > 10 minutes); ‡
• wIPL is 0.8;
• mIPL over a frame {Rob (R),Waiting for Friends (WF})} is specified by:
mIPL({R}) = 0.5,mIPL({WF}) = 0.3,mIPL({R,WF}) = 0.2;
• uIPL is given by:
uIPL(Rob) = 9, uIPL(Wait for Some Friends) = 3.
5. FINDING THE MOST DANGEROUS THREAT
The previous section developed a multi-attribute event representation and reasoning
model. Thus, by inference rules and classification algorithms, the system can provide non-
deterministic identification results. So, we need to describe the multiple possible states by
mass values. For instance, in Example 1, eg means that the person with ID 12 passing security
area at 18:03–18:05 is a male with a certainty degree of 70% by a classification algorithm with
ID 43; and in Example 2, the inferred event of eIPL with mIPL({Rob}) = 0.5 means that by the
rule in Example 2, a watched object who satisfies the condition of the rule has a possibility of
50% to undertake a robbery. Actually, the instantiated attribute with a state and a mass value
reflects the belief of the system: to which degree a given state of the attribute could happen.
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However, in real world, multiple events could be identified at the same time by different
sensors, whilst those events might not be at the same level of potential threats. As a result,
what the system believes is not enough to rank the relative importance of different suspects.
For example, given a bomb attacker with a low certainty and a drunk troublemaker with a high
certainty, the system should be able to determine which one should be pay more attention.
Thereby, to rank the threats, we have to consider which threat is the most dangerous one.
That is, we need to define the threat degree as a utility of each state regarding an attribute.
With the threat degree and the mass value for each possible state, we can finally calculate its
potential threat, and report the watched object with high potential threats. Now, combining
what the system believes (mass values of states) and what the system values (utilities), the
problem of detecting potential threats can be viewed as a decision problem: how to rank the
potential threat of each watched object properly? That motivates us to construct a decision
support system that can automatically rank watched objects in a multi-attribute surveillance
environment under uncertainty by the utility (the degree of potential threat) and the mass
function of different possible states of each attribute in this section.
5.1. Calculation of potential threat degree regarding each attribute
In this subsection, we will propose a method to calculate the degrees of potential threats
regarding each attribute.
Semantically, by Definition 5, the degree of potential threat (i.e., the utility of the states)
can be represented by substituting the frame of discernment Ωc for each attribute by a
frame of discernment Θ = {h1, ..., hn}, where each hi is a real number that has one-to-one
correspondence with a state in Ωc. For example, suppose the two gender states are ranked in a
10-level (i.e., 1-10, with 10 as the highest level and 1 as the lowest level) potential threat, and in
particular male is ranked 6 and female is ranked 4 (meaning that a male has a stronger potential
threat than a female). Then Ωc = {male, female} will be substituted by a frame of discernment
Θ = {6, 4}. Obviously, this direct substitution process does not change the mass values for
states or the number of elements in Ωc. Moreover, since humans can infer the intentions of
others through observing their behaviours8,23, the attribute of behaviours should be used
in rules by the event inference system to predict the intention of the watched objects. Here
note that it is the person’s intention, rather than his/her behaviour, that determines his/her
potential threat. Therefore, utilities are only concerned with the inferred events, reflecting
people’s intention, but not directly with the events of behaviours.
Hence, based on the mass function and the utility of states, we can obtain the expected
utility interval for the expected degree of potential threat by extending the Start’s method58
as follows:
Definition 7. For a watched object with ID x with respect to a given attribute c specified by
mass function mc,x over Θ = {h1, ..., hn}, where hi is a real number indicating the utility
(potential threat degree) of each possible value of attribute c, its expected utility interval









After the system obtains the expected utility interval, we can apply the following principle
to find the point-valued degree of potential threat regarding each attribute:
Definition 8. Let EUIc(x) = [Ec(x), Ec(x)] be an interval-valued expected degree of potential
threat of attribute c for watched object with ID x, δc(x) = des be the criticality function for
the events based on the background information by Definition 5, and n be the highest level of
potential threat, then the point-valued degree of potential threat of the watched object with ID
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x with respect to attribute c is given by:
νc(x) =
(1− δc(x))Ec(x) + δc(x)Ec(x)
n
. (8)
Actually, this definition is a normalised version of the Hurwicz criterion20. That is, n is
a normalisation factor to make sure that the point-valued degree of potential threat is in the
range of [0, 1]. The following theorem reveals the relation between the criticality function and
the point-valued degree of potential threat:
Theorem 1. Let EUIc(x) = [Ec(x), Ec(x)] be an interval-valued expected degree of potential
threat of the watched object with ID x regarding attribute c, δc(x) and δ
′
c(x) be the degrees of
criticality of the events in two different backgrounds respectively, δc(x) ≥ δ′c(x), and n be the
highest level of potential threat. Then νc(x) ≥ ν′c(x).
Proof
By formula (8), δc(x) ≥ δ′c(x), and since E ≥ E, we have:
νc(x)− ν′c(x) =












By Theorem 1, since δc(x) = des, we can find that the point-valued degree of potential
threat with respect to each attribute for the watched objects is higher if the set of events
happen in an area with high crime statistics in midnight than that if the set of events happen
in a lower crime area in morning.
The following theorem implies that Definition 8 captures some intuitions well.
Theorem 2. Let EUIc(k) = [Ec(k), Ec(k)] be an interval-valued expected degree of potential
threat of the attribute c for the watched object with ID k, δc(k) be the degrees of criticality of
the event involving the watched object with ID k, and n be the highest level of potential threat.
Then the point-valued degrees of potential threat for these two watched objects satisfy:
(i) if Ec(x) > Ec(y), then νc(x) > νc(y); and
(ii) if Ec(x) > Ec(y), Ec(x) > Ec(y), and δc(x) ≥ δc(y), then νc(x) > νc(y).
Proof
(i) By δc(k) ∈ [0, 1] (k ∈ {x, y}), we have
Ec(k) ≤ (1− δc(k))Ec(k) + δc(k)Ec(x) ≤ Ec(k).















So, item (i) holds.
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Table I. The notations of our model
Notation Interpretation
νi(x) DPT of watched object x for attribute i
wi the degree of importance for an attribute wi
g(wi, νi(x)) weighted DPT
R(g(wi, νi(x)), g(wj , νj(x))) Combined assessment of g(wi, νi(x) and g(wj , νj(x))
e ∈ (0, 1) the threshold to distinguish different combination attitudes
(ii) When Ec(x) > Ec(y), Ec(x) > Ec(y), and 0 ≤ δc(y) ≤ δc(x) ≤ 1, we have
νc(x)− νc(y) =
(1− δc(x))Ec(x) + δc(x)Ec(x)
n
− (1− δc(y))Ec(y) + δc(y)Ec(y)
n
=
(Ec(x)− Ec(y)) + δc(x)(Ec(x)− Ec(x))− δc(y)(Ec(y)− Ec(y))
n
≥ (Ec(x)− Ec(y)) + δc(x)(Ec(x)− Ec(x))− δc(x)(Ec(y)− Ec(y))
n
=
(1− δc(x))(Ec(x)− Ec(y)) + δc(x)(Ec(x)− (Ec(y))
n
>0.
So, item (ii) holds.
In fact, Theorem 2 exhibits two intuitions concerning the point-valued degrees of potential
threat of any two suspects: (i) for a given attribute, if the lowest expected degree of potential
threat of a suspect is higher than the highest expected degree of potential threat of another
suspect, the point-valued degree of potential threat of the first one should higher; and (ii) if
the criticality function for the events of a suspect is not more than that of the other, and the
lowest and highest expected degrees of potential threat of this suspect are higher than those
of the other respectively, the point-valued degree of potential threat of this one should higher.
5.2. A weighted aggregation operator
After obtaining the point-valued degree of potential threats of the watched objects regarding
each attribute, in order to rank the potential threats of all the suspects to take the
appropriate action directly, in this subsection we will discuss how to use a weighted aggregation
operator41,39,63 to calculate the overall degree of a potential threat for each watched object
after considering all relevant attributes. And Table I lists notations used in Ma et al.’s paper41,
where DPT (Degree of Potential Threat) involves a given attribute for watched object x.
Specifically, we use the following weighted aggregation operator the overall degree of
potential threat regarding any two attributes 1 and 2 as follows:
R(g(w1, ν1(x)), g(w2, ν2(x)))
=
(1− τ)g(w1, ν1(x))g(w2, ν2(x))
(1− τ)g(w1, ν1(x))g(w2, ν2(x)) + τ(1− g(w1, ν1(x)))(1− g(w2, ν2(x)))
, (9)
where τ is the threshold value to distinguish different types of attribute and
g(wi, νi(x)) = wiνi(x) + (1− wi)τ. (10)
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(1− τ)xy + τ(1− x)(1− y)
(11)
as shown in Luo et al.’s work36,35 with weighting function (10)63.
The reason why we suggest to employ the weighted uninorm that it satisfies all the
following basic principles that a threat assessment aggregation needs to follow, as argued
by Ma, Liu, and Hong41:
(i) Conclusion modification: Consider one more threat assessment for a given watched object
regarding a new attribute can increase, or decrease, or remain the current assessment.
(ii) Assessment consistency: The overall potential threat assessment for a given watched
object should increase when the point-valued degree of potential threat of a watched
object regarding each relevant attribute increases.
(iii) Assessment commensurability: A system needs to provide an overall assessment for each
watched object after the aggregation process, and the overall assessments for different
watched objects are comparable (on a commensurable scale).
(iv) Irrelevance of evidence ordering: The result of an aggregation should not be affected by
the ordering of aggregation.
(v) Importance dependency: The overall assessment depends on the importance (reflected as
a weight) of each attribute.
Moreover, the aggregation operator in formula (10) also has some desired properties63:
(i) monotonicity: if x1 ≥ y1 ∧ x2 ≥ y2 then R(x1, x2) ≥ R(y1, y2); (ii) boundary conditions:
R(0, 0) = 0 and R(1, 1) = 1; (iii) associativity: R(R(x1, x2), x3) = R(x1, R(x2, x3)); (iv)
symmetry: R(x1, x2) = R(x2, x1); and (v) neutral element: ∃e ∈ (0, 1), ∀x ∈ [0, 1], R(e, x) = x.
Finally, to rank the potential threats of watched objects according to their overall
assessments, we introduce the concept of preference ordering as follows:
Definition 9. For two watched objects x and y, the strict preference ordering  is defined as:
x  y ⇔ R(g(wi, νi(x)), . . . , g(wn, νn(x))) > R(g(wj , νj(y)), . . . , g(wm, νm(y))).
This preference ordering means that the potential threat of x is higher than that of y
if and only if the overall threat assessment of x is greater than that of y. Hence, together
with the equivalence relation ∼ (i.e., x ∼ y if x 6 y and y 6 x), we show that the preference
ordering in Definition 9 is a total order that satisfies the properties of completeness and strict
transitivity41.
5.3. The whole picture of our event model with decision support
After obtaining the overall degree of a potential threat of each watched object after considering
all the relevant attributes, now we can give the whole process of our event model with
decision support in this subsection. First, using our event model with decision support, a
security expert needs to determine: (i) the attributes’ weights, (ii) the criticality function for
different surveillance background, and (iii) the potential threat degree (utility) of each possible
conclusion regarding different attributes.
§The concept of uninorm is introduced by Yager and Rybalov63, and it is widely applied to many domains
such as automated negotiation36,37, fuzzy logic28, market basket analysis47, sequential decision making under
uncertainty21, fuzzy neural networks17, and so on.
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Figure 1. Procedure of our event model with decision support
Then, as shown in Figure 1, the procedure of our decision support framework is as follows.
(i) Determine each watched object’s possible relevant attributes based on the types of sensors
and different classification algorithms. (ii) Define multiple attributes atomic events based
on the the attributes weights, the criticality function for different surveillance background,
the potential threat degree of each possible conclusion regarding different attributes, the
information from different sensors, and algorithms for each watched object. (iii) Calculate
the discount mass function according to the degree of reliability of the events for each watched
object. (iv) Use Dempster combination rule to combine the discounted mass functions for
the events with the same attribute for each watched object. (v) Obtain inferred events with
respect to attribute Intention by the inference rules and the events with respect to any type of
behaviour attribute. (vi) Calculate the potential threat degree of each watched object regarding
each attribute (except all types of behaviour attribute) from the mass function and utility
function. (vii) Use the weighted uninorm aggregation operator to obtain the overall degree of
potential threat of each watched object from the potential threats regarding each attribute.
And (viii) determine the preference ordering.
6. ILLUSTRATION
In this section, we use the airport security surveillance scenario can deal with real-world
surveillance problems.
In the scenario, the surveillance system can rank the potential degree of each watched
object as follows:
(i) The surveillance system detects the atomic events for each person as shown in Tables
II and III based on the information of multiple sensors. For example, the first row in Table II
means that for an event of type SA (shopping area) in FCE (the foreign currency exchange)
shop at 21:01, the age classification algorithm used by camera 42 with reliability degree 0.9
detects a person with ID 13 as young with a certainty of 30%. The criticality of this event
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Table II. Event modelling the airport security surveillance scenario (i)
Event Type Time Location Source ID Criterion Person ID Reliability Significance Weight
e42a SA 21:01 FEC 42 age 13 0.9 0.7 0.3
e45a SA
21:03
FCE 45 age 13 0.9 0.7 0.3
-21:15
e42g SA 21:01 FCE 42 gender 13 0.9 0.7 0.3
e45g SA
21:03
FCE 45 gender 13 0.9 0.7 0.3
-21:15
e42m SA 21:01 FCE 42 move 13 0.9 0.7 0.8
e45m SA
21:03
FCE 45 move 13 0.9 0.7 0.8
-21:15
e29a CC 21:03 MoC 29 age 19 1 0.9 0.3
e29g CC 21:03 MoC 29 gender 19 1 0.9 0.3
e23sr CC 21:03 MoC 23 sr 19 1 0.9 0.8
where SA means Shopping Area, FCE means Foreign Currency Exchange, CC means Control Centre, MoC
means Middle of the Corridor.
Table III. Event modelling for the airport security surveillance scenario (ii), where Ωm = {walk to
east, . . . , walk, to north, loitering} and the scale of measurement for the degree of potential threat
is Θ = {1, . . . , 10}.
e mc uc
e42a m42,a({young}) = 0.3, m42,a({young, old}) = 0.7 ua(young) = 6, ua(old) = 2
e45a m45,a({young}) = 0.6, m45,a({young, old}) = 0.4 ua(young) = 6, ua(old) = 2
e42g m42,g({female}) = 0.4, m42,g({female,male}) = 0.6 ug(male) = 6, ug(female) = 4
e45g m45,g({male}) = 0.7, m42,g({female,male}) = 0.3 ug(male) = 6, ug(female) = 4
e42m m42,m({walk to east, loitering})=0.8, m42,m(Ωm)=0.3 determined by decision reference rules
e45m m45,m({loitering}) = 0.9, m45,m(Ωm) = 0.1 determined by decision reference rules
e29a m29,a({young}) = 0.7, m29,m({young, old}) = 0.3 ua(young) = 6, ua(old) = 2
e29g m29,a({male}) = 0.7, m29,m({male, female}) = 0.3 ug(male) = 6, ug(female) = 4
e23sr m23,sr({unmatch})=0.8, m23,m({unmatch,match})=0.2 usr(unmatch) = 9, usr(match) = 4
is 0.7, the weight of attribute age for detecting a potential threat is 0.3, and ua is the utility
function that shows the degree of potential threat regarding attribute age.
(ii) Since some sensors are not completely reliable in our example, we obtain the discounted
mass functions by formula (1). For example, regarding attribute age for the person in the
foreign currency exchange shop, we have
m42,a,r({young}) = m42,a × dsr(IDs,42) = 0.3× 0.9 = 0.27,
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and similarly we can obtain:
m42,a,r({young, old}) = 0.73,
m45,a,r({young}) = 0.54,
m45,a({young, old}) = 0.46.
(iii) We combine mass functions associated with events in different clusters (from different
sources) where these events are all about a common attribute, using Dempster’s rule in formula





=(0.27× 0.54 + 0.27× 0.46 + 0.73× 0.54)/1
=0.664.
And similarity we can obtain
m42,45,a,r({young, old}) = 0.336.
Note that the mass function is associated with a derived event:
e42&45a =(Te, te, loc, IDs, c, IDp, dsr(IDs), des(t, loc), wc,mc, uc)
=(SA, 21:01–21:15, FCE, 42&45, age, 13, 1, 0.7, 0.3,
(m42,45,a,r({young}) = 0.664,m42,45,a,r({young, old}) = 0.336), ua),
where m42,45,a,r is specified by the combination of the discounting mass function of e
42
a and
the discounting mass function of e45a .
(iv) We conduct the event inference. For the movement of the person in the foreign
currency exchange shop, by the similarly counting process of the discounted mass function
and the combination of the mass functions for attribute age by formulas (1) and (2), we have:
m42,45,m,r({walk to east, loitering}) = 0.137,
m42,45,m,r({loitering}) = 0.81,
m42,45,m,r(Ωm) = 0.053.




Similarly, we can obtain:
mIPL({Waiting for Friends}) = 0.24,
mIPL({Rob,Waiting for Friends}) = 0.35.
(v) We obtain the expected utility interval for each attribute of each person by Definition
7. For example, for the person with ID 13 in the foreign currency exchange shop, we have:
[Ea, Ea] = [4.656, 6];
[Eg, Eg] = [5.044, 5.656];
[EIPL, EIPL] = [5.43, 7.542].
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Figure 2. Process of the airport scenario
(vi) We calculate the point-valued degree of potential threat for each attribute of each
person by Definition 8. For example, for the person with ID 13 in the foreign currency exchange
shop, by formula (8), we have
νa(13) =
(1− des(t, loc))Ea(13) + des(t, loc)Ea(13)
n
=
(1− 0.7)× 4.656 + 0.7× 6
10
=0.56.
Similarly, we can obtain:
νg(13) = 0.547,
νIPL(13) = 0.691.
(vii) We can calculate the overall degree of potential threat of each watched object after
considering all relative attributes at 9:15 pm by the weighted aggregation operator in formula
(10). Suppose τ = 0.5, for the person p13 in the foreign currency exchange shop, we have
g(0.3, νa(13)) =waνa(13) + (1− wa)τ
=0.3× 0.56 + (1− 0.3)× 0.5
=0.518.
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Similarly, we have:
g(0.3, νg(13)) = 0.514,
g(0.8, νIPL(13)) = 0.653.
Thus, by formula (9), we have
R(g(0.3, νa(13)), g(0.3, νg(13)), g(0.8, νIPL(13)))
=
1
1 + ( 0.51−0.5 )
3−1 × (1−0.518)(1−0.514)(1−0.653)0.518×0.514×0.653
=0.681.
Similarly, for the person p19 in the control centre, we can obtain
R(g(0.3, νa(19)), g(0.3, νg(19)), g(0.8, νsr(19))) = 0.843.
Thus, we can rank the potential threat of the watched objects according to their overall
assessment by Definition 9. That is,
p19  p13.
Therefore, the surveillance system should suggest the security team to prevent the further
action of person p19 in the control centre first.
7. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss the related work to show how our work advances the state-of-art
in its research field.
7.1. Threat/risk assessment
There are lots of work on threat/risk assessment, but little deal with ambiguity in threat
assessment and threat caused by a potential terrorist attack and anti-social/criminal behaviour.
In the following, we compare some existing studies with our study in this paper.
Naseem, Khan, and Malik49 propose an approach for threat assessment and weapon
assignment. According to threat perception, the model uses the parametric based automatic
threat assessment technique for further weapon scheduling and assignment problem. The threat
they studied is in combat situation and the purpose of threat assessment is to schedule weapons
to maximally kill enemy. Rather, the threat we concern is about terrorist attack and anti-
social/criminal behaviours, and the purpose of our threat assessment is to rank the threat
degrees of multiple objects, so that we can more efficiently allocate limited security sources to
prevent terrorist attack and anti-social/criminal behaviours.
Kong et al.31 deal with the issue of threat assessment of group target that is consisted
of multi-class weapons. Assessing the threat of group target is for the optimal decision of
troop deployment. More specifically, they propose a multi-attribute group decision-making
method to solve the interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy threat assessment problem of group
targets without known attribute weights and decision maker’s preference weights. There are
some significant differences between our work and theirs. First, ours is concerned with terrorist
attack and anti-social/criminal behaviours instead of weapons. Second, we handle ambiguous
threat by using D-S theory of evidence, while they cope with interval-valued threat by using
fuzzy set theory. Third, we use a weighted uninorm operator to aggregate threat degrees of all
the attributes, while they use weighted average operator.
Zharikova and Sherstjuk68 propose a qualitative danger and threat assessment method
based on the principle of the maximal allowable limits for an intelligent disaster decision
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support system. Their method employs the rough set based plausible disaster spreading model
and the formal model of the territorial system. Our model in this paper is different from theirs
in at least two aspects: (i) our concern is threat caused by human, while theirs is that caused
by natural disasters; and (ii) the tool we use to handle uncertainty is D-S theory of evidence,
while that they use is rough set theory50.
In order to address the numerous risks associated with seaport operations, John et al.29
develop a subjective security risk analysis method to enhance the security of seaport systems.
Specifically, they employs a fuzzy analytical hierarchy process to analyse the complex structure
of the system and determine the weights of security systems/measures, while utilise evidential
reasoning to synthesise the risk analysis. Our work is different from them in the following two
aspects: (i) the security issue in our work is caused by potential terrorist attacks and anti-
social/criminal behaviours, while that in their work is caused by the complex interactions of
the multiplicity of stakeholders involved in their operations in seaport; and (ii) we use D-S
theory of evidence to handle uncertainty, while they use fuzzy method and evidential reasoning.
Chen, Gao, and Zhong13 deal with the threat assessment problem for unmanned aerial
vehicles in modern air combat. More specifically, they use a fuzzy grey cognitive map for threat
assessment in air battlefield and validate their method. Our work in this paper is different from
them in the following two aspects: (i) The purpose that we assess threat is to prevent terrorist
attacks and anti-social/criminal behaviours, while theirs is for efficient operation of unmanned
aerial vehicles in modern air combat; and (ii) we deal with ambiguity in the process of threat
assessment by using D-S theory of evidence, while they deal with fuzziness by using fuzzy grey
cognitive map.
To express the probability information existing in the hesitancy more conveniently,
Song et al.57 generalise the concept of probabilistic hesitant fuzzy set to interval-valued
probabilistic hesitant fuzzy set (IVPHFS). Moreover, they propose some aggregation operators
over IVPHFSs. Further, they discuss how to use IVPHFSs aggregation operators to deal with
practical multi-criterion group decision making problems, for example, the problem of Arctic
geopolitical risk evaluation. Our method also uses an aggregation operator based method of
multi-criterion decision making to evaluate threat/risk, but ours differs from theirs in the
following aspects: (i) we use D-S theory of evidence to deal with the ambiguous information,
while they use fuzzy set theory to deal with interval-valued probabilistic hesitant fuzzy
information; and (ii) what they evaluate is Arctic geopolitical risk, while what we do is the
threat of terrorist attacks and anti-social behaviours.
Szwed, Skrzynski, and Chmiel60 propose an efficient and low-cost risk assessment method
to calculate risk based on fuzzy cognitive maps (FCMs) in a complex automated video
surveillance system, which goal is to provide continuous protection of critical infrastructure
and other facilities. In their model, FCMs are employed to model dependencies between assets
and FCM based reasoning is employed to aggregate risks associated to assets. Although in our
work surveillance system is involved, we employ D-S evidence theory to calculate the threat
degree of each event according to uncertain information from multiple heterogeneous sources,
which are different sensors, cameras and even human; while in their model there is only video.
And in our model uncertainty is about sources’ reliability and ambiguity about recognition
of objects being watched, while in their model it is about fuzzy dependencies among assets.
In addition, to assess an overall threat degree of an object being observed we use a weighted
uninorm operator to fuse the conflict threat degrees regarding all the relevant attributes, while
they use FCM based reasoning to aggregate risks associated to assets.
In order to avoid underestimating the results of security risk analysis and subsequent
rank ordering of units, Khakzad, Reniers, and van Gelder30 address the interactions among
the security risk parameters (e.g., the mutual influence between the type of threat and the
target assets). Specifically, they use analytic network process (ANP) to security-based rank
ordering of hazardous facilities such as chemical plants, because ANP can well deal with mutual
interactions and overcome the disadvantage of the linearity of current security risk assessment
methodologies. The main differences between their work and ours are as follows: (i) they deal
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with interaction among risk parameters, while we suppose the attributes that cause threats
are independent of each other; (ii) their work is concerned with the security of hazardous
facilities such as chemical plants, while we concern the security of public; and (iii) we consider
ambiguity in the process of assessing threat, but they do not.
Chi et al.15 present a decision support system for crime linkage based on various, including
behavioral, features of criminal cases. This system is based on feature similarity algorithms
to calculate the pairwise similarities and build up a classifier to determine whether or not a
case pair should belong to a criminal series. However, this model only focuses on the issue of
detecting serial crimes from historical crime data and domain experts interaction. As a result,
it only works as an off-line prediction method rather than a real-time threat detection method
as our model does.
Zheng and Deng69 propose an evaluation method based on fuzzy relations between the
DempsterShafer belief structure. In their method, mass functions are used to model the
occurrence rate of attributes in basic events. This is similar to our work in this paper, but their
events are not specific to threat events like ours and they do not define the model of an event
as we do. In their method, the membership degree functions of fuzzy sets to describe relations
between events, from which the relations among basic events and the top event can be derived.
Finally, they use Dempster combination rule, pignistic probability, and a belief measure to
evaluate these relations among events. However, what we evaluate is events themselves (i.e.,
events threat degrees according to the information from all the sources) rather the relations
among them. In addition, their examples for illustrating their evaluation method is numerical
(without any specific meaning), while ours is a specific scenario in an intelligent surveillance
system.
7.2. Security game for crime prevention
Our work in this paper is actually on crime prevention. In the field of crime prevention,
there are a lot of studies on security games. In such a game, suppose an attacker attempts to
attack a number of targets, while the defender tries to protect them. However, the defender
has limited resources and cannot protect all targets at the same time. Then how to allocate
limited resources to best protect many targets and minimise possible losses? The researchers
answered this question in various situations. For example, Ma, Luo, and Liu43 study that when
the payoffs that an attacker attacks different targets of the attacker and the defender protect
the different targets are uncertain or only in a rough range and even completely unknown,
how the defender chooses countermeasures. Ma et al.42 also analyses the type of attacker,
predicts the target of possible attacks, and the actions that may be taken, and finds the
defender’s strategy. Zhang, Luo, and Ma67 studied how defenders should respond when the
type of attacker is ambiguous. Zhang and Luo66 also studied how defenders should respond
when an attacker can observe partially the defender’s behaviour. These are all issues related
to the allocation of resources in advance. In addition, Ma et al.44 also studied the allocation of
real-time security resources under uncertain and ambiguous situations. All of the above studies
are based on D-S theory of evidence theory and the decision-making psychology that people
try to avoid the ambiguous choice and like a choice that has as low regret as possible.
All these security games assume the payoffs of defenders’ choices and attackers’ choices
are known. In other words, they suppose the defender knows threat degrees of the attackers
to different targets and then find the optimal security source allocation to prevent crimes.
However, our work in this paper tries to figure out threat degrees of objects being watched.
7.3. Information fusion
The problem of information fusion has become one of key challenges in the realm of intelligent
systems35,39,64. A common method to address this challenge is to use aggregation operators.
Albusac et al.5 analyse different aggregation operators and proposed a new aggregation method
based on the Sugeno integral for multiple attributes in the domain of intelligent surveillance.
Also, Rudas, Pap, and Fodor53 offer a comprehensive study of information aggregation in
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intelligence systems from different application fields, such as robotics, vision, knowledge
based systems, and data mining. Aggarwal2 uses the generalised attitudinal Choquet integral
operator to present utility function of a decision maker and learn its parameters. And our
method indeed employs a uninorm aggregation operator for information fusion in threat
assessment under uncertainty.
We actually applied a uninorm aggregation operator into a specific Multi-Attribute
DecisionMaking (MADM) problems. Recently there are a lot of studies to do so. For example,
Garg and Arora25 develop some new power aggregation operators for intuitionistic fuzzy
soft numbers and applied these operators into MADM problems. Garg24 identifies two new
exponential operational laws about the intervalvalued Pythagorean fuzzy set, presents their
corresponding aggregation operators and an MADM approach based on these operators.
Ashraf and Abdullah6 introduce the concept of spherical fuzzy sets, extend different strict
archimedean triangular norm and conorm to aggregate spherical fuzzy information, and
establish a group MADM method based on these operators. Jana et al.27 discuss how to apply
picture fuzzy Dombi aggregation operator to MADM process. However, all their decision-
making problems are specific to threat assessment as ours is.
7.4. Event processing
Based on D-S theory of evidence, Calderwood et al.10 present an event modelling and reasoning
framework where events observed from heterogeneous sources may be uncertain or incomplete,
and sensors may be unreliable or in conflict. So their work is quite similar to ours, but
their framework cannot help security teams figure out which event is the most dangerous.
Also, Calderwood et al.9 study how to fuse the uncertain and incomplete information from
heterogeneous sources which may be unreliable or conflicting. They use D-S theory of evidence
to model the sensor information, but they employ a different method, called context-dependent
combination, to fuse the information. They claim their fusion method has some advances over
the Dempster combination rule in D-S theory of evidence. Although we do not have their
advances when fusing sensor information, they did not study how to rank the fused information
to figure out the most dangerous event, but we do.
Flouris et al.22 survey the main research issues in existing complex event processing
techniques, especially in the optimisation aspect of query on event streams. However,
their event data are generated from machine-to-machine interactions and Internet-of-Things
platforms, while ours are from sensors in intelligent surveillance systems. And their focus is on
the optimisation aspect of query on event streams, but ours is on how to rank threat events.
Finally, although they investigate probabilistic events, the ambiguous events are not involved
in their work; while we use D-S theory to deal with ambiguous events.
Dayarathna and Perera16 also provide another survey on event processing. In particular,
they investigate the system architecture characteristics of novel platforms of event processing,
identify significant advancements in novel application areas (e.g., the Internet of Things,
streaming machine learning, and processing of complex data types such as text, video data
streams, and graphs), and discuss some work on event ordering, system scalability, event
processing languages, and heterogeneous devices usage for event processing. However, they
did not discuss the ambiguous event processing in intelligent surveillance systems, which we
deal with in this paper.
Ma et al.40 propose a real-time event composition framework which can infer malicious
situations (composite events) from a set of correlated atomic events based on uncertain or
imperfect information gathered from multiple sources. This is similar to our work in this
paper, but their framework does not support decision making. Moreover, their event model
is very simple. More specifically, after considering the challenges for the multi-attribute issue,
our event model in this paper remains their components of event type (Te) and source ID
(IDs), whilst put more components into consideration, including the time duration of an event
(te), the location information of an event (loc), the ID of a watched object/person (IDp), the
reliability degree of a given source (dsr(IDs)), the criticality function of an event (des(t, loc)),
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the weight function of an attribute (wc), mass function mc, and utility function uc. Therefore,
ours is more convenient and intuitive than the one proposed by Ma et al.40. For example,
suppose a sensor captures a person sitting in the waiting area of an airport from 21:15 to
22:00. Then in our model, it should be considered as one event; but in that of Ma et al.40, it
needs to be viewed as a set of events, each of which has its own mass function that cannot
combine together since they have different times of occurrence.
8. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a novel framework that can help a security team to choose the
dangerous event to deal with when facing ambiguous information of multiple watched object
from unreliable sources in a sensors network. More specifically, we propose video-analytic and
sensor measurements in the shape of multi-attribute events. Further, we introduce the rules for
the inference of event with a potential threat. Then, we assess the threats of watched objects by
integrating the techniques of D-S theory of evidence, generalised expected utility theory, and
a weighted uninorm aggregation operator. Thus, we can rank the potential threat of multiple
watched objects according to the conflicting, ambiguous information provided by multiple
sensors or classification algorithms. That is, we assess the threat of each watched object
according to the potential dangerous degrees of the characteristics of various watched objects
as well as the threat degree of the watched object revealed by the ambiguous information in
the sensor network.
There are a number of avenues for further work to follow what we did in this paper. First,
it is worth discussing the differences among various decision making principle in uncertain
theory for security surveillance, such as the principle of insufficient reason, minimax regret,
maximin expected utility20, and the ambiguity aversion principle of minimax regret45. Second,
in the case of limited security resources11 and the different importance of various surveillance
environments, a security manager needs to reduce the consumption of security resources, or pay
more attention to avoiding unacceptable losses. Therefore, it is necessary to construct or choose
a flexible aggregation operator that can reflect individualities of different security managers in
combining evidence from different sources in different surveillance environments. Some clues
of such aggregation operators may be hidden in some recent work on aggregation operators in
multi-criterion decision making38,25,59. Third, in a real-time surveillance environment, if the
suspects have more than one potential attack targets but the security resources are limited,
the security manger needs to consider the suspect’s simultaneously response to the security
coverage, the suspect’s uncertain preferences, and his plan according to the information from
the surveillance system. In this case, it is reasonable to employ game theory to better allocate
the security resource according to the threat information available in our framework.
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